such as the European Convention on Human Rights, but the comparison and evaluation of sanctioning systems, as well as ideas on how to improve them. 
Empirical data
For this reason, I will first turn to the empirical aspect of the topic: Is it possible to observe bias among real-life legal decision-makers? In 1996 a practising competition lawyer published a study in which he examined to what extent decisions taken by the European Commission that had been challenged by the parties were upheld by the European courts. The analysis shows that in the majority of cases a court reversed or modified the Commission's decision for one reason or another. The author of the study concluded that the Commission procedure is questionable, and that the system as such is fundamentally in need of reform. 4 This reasoning is sound, and yet the results of this study could reveal a different conclusion: if parties are so often successful in achieving a The study I would like to report on referred to the stage between the first and second decisions of the FTC as a collegial body in merger cases: the first decision, with which the Commission decreed not to allow a merger, and to bring the case before an administrative law judge, and the second, in which it decided whether to follow the judgment of the administrative law judge. In the first of these two decisions, one can see the FTC as a kind of investigative agency; in the second, it plays the role of a court of appeal that is reviewing the decision of the administrative law judge. It is not always the case that the FTC is made up of the same personnel for the second decision as it was for the first. The proceeding before the administrative law judge alone often takes several years, and by the time the case is re-decided by the FTC, a number of the Commissioners, who are appointed by the US president, may have changed.
The study of interest here referred to seventy merger proceedings conducted by the FTC between the 1950s and the early 1990s. The first column lists the number of Commissioners who participated in both decisions. The second shows the percentage of cases in which the second decision completely corresponds, in content, to the first.
Where two of the Commissioners were the same in both proceedings, the original decision was upheld in 58% of the cases; if three were the same, it was upheld in 87% of the cases. If the Commission that reached the final decision was completely or almost completely, i.e. four-fifths, identical with the original Commission, however, there was not a single case of divergence from the original Commission decision to prohibit a merger.
The numbers would suggest a bias in those people who are called upon to decide a case with which they have had previous contact. 7 It seems remarkable that all the cases in which four or even five of the Commissioners participated in the original decision came to the same conclusion after the proceeding before the administrative law judge as beforehand, whereas an FTC made up of different people arrived at a different evaluation in a significant portion of the cases. 
Behavioural Sciences
So much for empirical data -which perhaps suggest, but do not prove, that people who have worked in investigation and prosecution are not impartial when it comes to deciding a case. I would like to approach the problem with you from yet another angle: the economic sciences are in flux -moving perhaps more quickly than the legal sciences. Since the 1990s, economists have increasingly been discussing and studying how humans really behave -and why they behave that way. Behavioural economics is the key term here. The conclusions to be drawn in the legal field, then, are a matter of behavioural law and economics.
What can modern behavioural economics contribute to the topic put before us on the design of proceedings in antitrust law enforcement? Behavioural economists have looked at, among other things, the way decision-making processes come about, including those over a period of time. The psychological problem of cognitive dissonance has long been studied. Cognitive dissonance refers to the uncomfortable situation of a person with a clash of cognitions -that is, conflicting perceptions or opinions. The problem of such an internal conflict is often solved by the person's 7 The title of the study seems to suggest this conclusion "Does it matter that the prosecutor is also the judge?". 8 The authors of the study offer various explanations for its results: See Malcolm B. Coate/Andrew N. Kleit (supra note 6) at p 9.
granting precedence to the position he or she first adopted. It is unpleasant for many people to question decisions they have made. It can aggravate the situation when the original decision has been announced, and reasons for it given, externally.
9 Even independently of this first possible explanation why people often prefer to continue along a path already chosen, there is an explanation for the fact that decisions are often upheld by the original decision-maker, and less often revised. With the term of confirmation bias, psychologists and economists describe the tendency to give more weight to facts that confirm one's own expectations -and conversely, to attach less importance to facts that seem to contradict one's own expectations.
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What does all of this tell us about our topic? The conclusion is: it is all too human for decision-makers who in a first situation have evaluated a factual circumstance in a certain manner to stick to their original assessment even after a proceeding has been held, such as a hearing and the gathering of evidence. 11 The civil-service teams of competition-law authorities should not take this assessment personally -the behavioural sciences indicate to us that it is indeed not a personal, but rather a "superpersonal", an immanently impersonal problem. The flaw, when one and the same person is biased in a second decision about the same case, is to be found not within the person, but within the procedure.
Conclusion
What can we conclude from all of this for our topic: as regards the design of competitionlaw enforcement in the variant of administrative enforcement, thus public enforcement? There areroughly -three options: The first consists in staying generally within the system of administrative decisions, though certainly while doing away with the notion that this system generates completely objective administrative decisions.
In doing so, one would in effect decide in the way it seems the Japanese legislature will be deciding: there as well, there has been a legal-policy discussion about the requirement of due process in competition-law administrative proceedings; currently a legislative project is pending in parliament.
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The reform will probably not do away with the system of administrative decision by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, but merely reinforce the position and the possibilities for legal protection of the concerned parties. Thus, within the administrative procedure there is to be, for example, the right to the constant presence of one's attorneys, and -with respect to confidential information -the so-called lawyer's privilege, and the Tokyo District Court is to provide for effective legal protection against orders from the JFTC.
In my opinion, the concept of the administrative procedure can remain in discussion: one could retain the basic fundaments of the present system on the EU level -while accepting the possibility that within a competition authority the eagerness of the personnel and repeated handling of a case may stand in opposition to complete objectivity in reaching a decision. For such deficits in the system there are possibilities of legal protection, and if these appear to be insufficient -as it might have been the case in the past in Japan -then this will be the place to apply corrections to the system.
Still, one could say that being able to go to court is not in fact sufficient compensation for an imperfect administrative procedure. Court protection is expensive; courts would perhaps only confirm the injured party's position after years of proceedings, so that at least in the interim there would already be -possibly irreversible -damage done. And in the end, depending on its concrete design, court protection is in turn an imperfect means of protection, for instance when -as is the case when decisions of the European Commission are reviewed -the courts in their assessment of complex economic situations limit themselves to testing whether the rules of procedure and admissibility have been observed, whether the facts have been appropriately stated, and whether there has been no obvious error in processing the case and no abuse of discretion.
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When these deficiencies are tallied up, one could decide to give up the system of administrative decisions and -option 2 -go to the opposite extreme, the judicial system. One model for this system could be, for instance, the new Austrian law. The competition authority here cannot issue any intervening orders, but must go to court. 14 The ancestor of this judicial system is, of course, US-American law. I have already mentioned that the Department of Justice cannot independently issue prohibition orders, but must file a suit with a federal court. This is also true when the Department of Justice carries out merger-control proceedings.
Here -in merger control -the drawbacks of the judicial system become especially visible, however. Precisely here, the parties rely particularly on a quick and clear clarification of the legal situation. They want to merge now, not in three years, when a judicial assessment has been achieved. From an economic perspective as well, it seems most urgent to rapidly achieve an unequivocal legal situation in merger cases, considering that the advantages to the economy of restructuring measures can come about only when mergers are completed. expected to hand down a final opinion in every single case in which the competition authority decides to intervene, then this would presuppose a transition to a different type of jurisdiction -to a system in which the courts themselves would undertake an assessment of even complex economic facts. This does not seem to me to suit the existing court system of the European Union. Even in Austria, the cartel court, which decides on applications of the federal competition authority, is a court created especially for this type of proceedings. This is likewise to be the case in Switzerland, where a special federal competition court is to be set up.
Without a specialised court system, I am afraid the transition to the judicial system would bring with it a loss of significance for competition law and competition policy. We must imagine the situation that would occur more and more frequently after switching to the judicial system: a specialised competition authority, in order to obtain, say, a prohibition order, would have to convince a not particularly specialised court that its (the authority's) own -even economicassessment of the case is correct in every aspect. The unspecialised court would be faced with the 15 Draft Bill for a revision of the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition.
submissions of, on the one hand, the specialised authority, and on the other, the just as specialised representatives of the companies. This may be an appropriate situation when a previous order is under legal review. But if the bar is set just as high for a first-time issue of such an order, it seems to me that this must naturally result in a decrease in the intensity of prosecution.
This brings me to the third option: the possibility of further developing the administrative system.
If it is seen as a failing of the existing administrative system that the same individuals investigate, prosecute and decide, then this should be our point of departure in order to design the system in a more compelling way: The functions of investigation and prosecution, on the one hand, and decision-making on the other, would -as has been suggested by one author or another for It would appear especially important to effectively separate this team that prepares the decision from the case team, or more generally: from the directorate-general of competition. In organisational terms, it would make sense to place the decision-preparation team near the president of the Commission. In spatial terms such a separation would be important as well, so that no atmosphere can develop -during regular common lunches in the same bureau cafeteria, for instance -that would be conducive to a coordination of the work of the case team and the decisionpreparation team.
One might well ask what would be gained by this solution, as opposed to a transition to the judicial system. The procedure sketched out here could lead to similarly expeditious decisions as the Commission has issued up to now. Admittedly, the successive occupation of two teams will take more time than that of just one working group. But the procedure could still produce much quicker results than in an obligatory court proceeding. Courts are independent, and one dimension in which their independence is expressed is that of time: courts decide on their own organisation and scheduling. In contrast, different time demands could be made of a unit set up within the same authority. 
